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Abstract
We propose a design of a client reputation system that can be used to reduce unwanted traﬃc in the Internet.
Many reputation systems proposed in the trust literature are provider-oriented, but because of diﬀerent use
and adversary models, their techniques are not directly applicable to client reputation systems. We survey
the challenges of building client reputations, discuss two diﬀerent approaches to information collection —
a reporter and a monitor model — and propose their combination that successfully handles major threats
to reputation validity.
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1 Introduction
Reputation systems are commonly used to build a reputation of a service provider,
which aids a user in selection of a trustworthy provider [1,6,3]. In this paper we
discuss a client reputation system, which aids service providers in deciding to accept
or decline interaction with a given client. Such a system could signiﬁcantly advance
defenses against major security threats, such as intrusions, distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks and worm spread incidents. These threats are extremely
diﬃcult to address because the legitimate and malicious traﬃc look very much alike.
A server usually has to process some malicious traﬃc before it can detect a security
problem. This window of vulnerability can lead to a server’s compromise (in case
of intrusions and worms) or a failure (in case of DDoS). An advance knowledge of
a client’s trustworthiness, provided by reputations, would help lower a server’s risk
of compromise and failure.
Client reputations could also be used for traﬃc prioritization during congestion
events. In case of heavy worm and DDoS traﬃc some packets must be dropped to
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relieve network congestion. Since legitimate and attack traﬃc are hard to separate,
legitimate users’ traﬃc usually suﬀers signiﬁcant collateral damage. Client reputa-
tions would help prioritize drops so that traﬃc from clients with low reputations is
dropped ﬁrst and well-behaved clients experience fewer service disruptions.
A key insight behind client reputations is that a given host tends to be well-
administered or poorly-administered over a considerable time, and that hosts that
have behaved maliciously in the past warrant a lower trust since they are likely
to misbehave in the future. A study of host scanning patterns [16] supports this
assumption. It revealed that top 1024 scanners are responsible for 90% of all scans
and that large scanners persist over a considerably long time. Blacklisting these
repeat oﬀenders would dramatically reduce scan traﬃc in the Internet. If each
server used its own observations to assemble a list of good or bad clients, this
list would be stale and incomplete because an average server communicates with a
moderately large, slowly-changing circle of clients. Building a collective memory of
client behavior by combining observations from multiple servers through reputations
has a clear advantage over this isolated approach.
While some techniques from provider reputation systems can be reused in a
context of client reputations, there are many unique and complex challenges that
demand novel solutions. In this paper we provide a systematic examination of these
challenges and propose a speciﬁc architecture for building and maintaining client
reputations.
1.1 Contributions
This is the ﬁrst paper that provides a systematic overview of diﬀerences between
provider and client reputations. We survey challenges that are unique to client
reputation systems, assuming a realistic adversary model and an open reputation
system where any entity can participate. We also discuss two diﬀerent architectures
for collection of client behavior information that is needed for reputation building:
a reporter model, where servers rank their experiences with clients, and a monitor
model where independent observers rank client behavior using observations of its
traﬃc patterns. Finally, we show how a combination of reporter and monitor models
can overcome major threats to reputation validity.
2 Collecting Information for Reputation Building
We consider two approaches for collection of client behavior information. The re-
porter model works as a classic reputation system, in which servers who have commu-
nicated with a given client rate this client through reports. Reports are submitted
to reputation centers that can be managed as a centralized or a distributed ser-
vice. The monitor model engages large Internet service providers that relay traﬃc
between many clients and servers, in monitoring this traﬃc and building models
of clients’ behavior. Monitors’ vantage locations facilitate correlation of malicious
behaviors and easy detection of scanning and worm propagation. Hosts involved in
such incidents can be ﬂagged as bad immediately, while other hosts can be ﬂagged
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as anomalous if they diverge from their usual behavior and a prolonged divergence
can lower their reputation. The monitor model is necessarily centralized, as mon-
itor’s locations must be chosen so to observe majority of routes. Monitors must
also be trusted to compute reputation scores, and may be used to store and serve
reputations.
We denote a server’s report or a monitor’s observation with a common term
info-item and we call a reporter or a monitor an information source. In both
models, reputations could be served to requesting parties in a form of an aggregated
score or “raw” — as a history detailing a client’s behavior and leaving the score
computation to the requester. While the second approach is preferable because
it can accommodate individual polices for score calculation, it endangers privacy
because info-items leak information about a client’s communication patterns. We
now propose an anonymization approach that addresses these privacy concerns.
We will assume that only bad info-items are generated, and we will discuss shortly
whether good info-items would be valuable.
Let an info-item i = {a, c, con} be submitted by the information source a about
the client c. The info-item speciﬁes more details (context) about the observed
malicious activity in the con ﬁeld. We assume that this ﬁeld is standardized and
speciﬁes the type of a security incident (scan, worm, DDoS, anomaly) and some
type-speciﬁc details, e.g., the range of scanned ports, the port targeted by a worm,
the rate, the duration and the type of a DDoS attack, etc. The info-item i is
anonymized by the reputation center a follows:
anon(i) = {p, i.c, np, i.con}; p = pseudonym(i.a), np = pts(i.con) (1)
The function pseudonym(a) is a non-reversible function that maps the identity of
the information source a into a pseudonym. This mapping must be consistent even
if the reputation system is distributed, and can be achieved by applying a private
hash function to the identity a using a secret key, which is shared among reputation
centers. The pts function maps in a standardized manner the type of a security
incident and its packet rate, extracted from the context ﬁeld, into negative points
np to be added to the reputation score. Reputation users may either use the np
value speciﬁed in the anonymized info-item, or apply their customized pts function
to the i.con ﬁeld to calculate the update for the client’s reputation.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Adversary model : We assume that an attacker can compromise no
more than M other machines, and organize them into a botnet. We will refer to
these compromised machines, controlled by one attacker, as bots. Given that botnets
of 500, 000 nodes have been discovered [10], M could be very large. An attacker can
use bots to perform malicious activities in any chosen engagement pattern, and to
fully participate in the reputation system by submitting info-items about bots and
about other clients.
If good info-items were allowed, bots could ﬁle good info-items about each other,
boosting their reputations. They could also, at any time, elicit good info-items from
legitimate servers (in the reporter model) or from monitors (in the monitor model)
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by engaging in legitimate transactions. For these reasons, we conclude that good
info-items are meaningless and eliminate them from further discussion. We will
assume that a client is good if no bad info-item was ﬁled against it, as proposed in
[1].
Reputation systems frequently use the reputation of an information source to
judge validity of its reports. In [2] authors propose a reporter model in which users
of the reputations vote for or against reports they used, rating their value. Since
our adversary model assumes that an attacker has control over a large number of
bots, the attacker can ensure a majority vote in any scenario.
Additional drawback of voting in client reputation systems is that a server cannot
vote for bad info-items that it has used. If an interaction with a client c was rejected
by the server s because of a bad info-item ﬁled by the information source a, s cannot
conﬁrm that the activity would have been malicious and thus cannot vote in favor
of a.
While we have not thoroughly explored the possible space of voting techniques
for client reputations, from this preliminary discussion it appears that voting cannot
be suﬃciently secured to provide useful input for client reputation building.
3 Deﬁnitions and Assumptions
We now list several deﬁnitions that set foundations for a client reputation system.
For simplicity, we only consider a system that prevents interaction with clients who
have participated in scanning, DDoS or worm incidents. This model could be easily
extended to penalize other malicious behaviors.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Good client is a client that has never been an object of a bad info-
item. Bad client is a client that has been an object of a bad info-item at least
once.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Current-bad client is a client that has been an object of a bad info-
item at least once in the recent Tint seconds. Similarly, current-good client has not
been an object of a bad info-item during the recent Tint seconds.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Long-term reputation is a reputation that takes into account all
info-items about a client, regardless of the item age. Similarly, short-term reputation
only takes into account items created during the recent Tint seconds.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Reputation use. Client reputations are used in the following man-
ner: (1) During DDoS attacks and worm spread incidents long-term reputations
are used to identify bad clients. Traﬃc to a DDoS victim or to a worm probe
port is prioritized, serving ﬁrst good clients and then serving or dropping traﬃc
from bad clients. (2) Short-term reputations are used during normal operation to
identify current-good and current-bad clients. All traﬃc from current-bad clients is
dropped. Traﬃc from current-good clients is accepted.
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4 Diﬀerences Between Provider and Client Reputations
Main diﬀerences between provider and client reputation models are the following:
Higher price of a false positive. In a provider reputation model, reputation
users are the clients whose goal is to ﬁnd at least one trustworthy provider. If
a provider is mistakenly assigned a low reputation, clients can migrate towards
high-reputation providers so client satisfaction remains high. In a client reputation
model, service providers are reputation users. Their security goal to avoid malicious
clients conﬂicts with their business goal to serve as many clients as they can. If a
client is mistakenly assigned a low reputation score this leads to business loss for
providers, so the price of a false positive is high.
Inconsistency of bad behavior. A provider has a consistent good or bad
behavior. For example, an eBay seller may frequently deliver damaged goods, or
refuse to replace them, a peer in a ﬁle-sharing network may always have high delay
because it is on a slow link, etc. It thus makes sense to create a provider’s reputation
by a majority vote and to expect that customers’ votes will match. Some reputation
systems even use mismatching reports to identify lying customers [1]. Conversely,
a malicious client does not need to act maliciously all the time. In fact, security
incidents are much more infrequent than normal transactions. If a compromised
machine is used daily by its owner for legitimate transactions, and only sporadically
by an attacker for malicious activities, providers’ majority vote would always result
in a good reputation.
Sparse communication patterns. While an average provider is expected to
provide service to a diverse customer population, an average client may only com-
municate with a few providers over a considerably long time. Provider reputation
systems frequently use diversity of reporters to build conﬁdence in the aggregated
reputation score, e.g., a seller ranked as good by two customers will have a lower
reputation than a seller that was ranked as good by a thousand customers, although
their mean rank is the same. Information source diversity cannot be used to build
reputation conﬁdence in a client reputation system, because this diversity may nat-
urally be low: a malicious client’s behavior may aﬀect a single server or be observed
by a single monitor.
We identify two sets of conﬂicting design requirements from the above discussion:
Conﬂict 1: Isolated bad info-items must be believed vs. False positives must be
low. A compromised client is expected to commonly invoke a few bad info-items.
The only way to lower a bad client’s reputation is to believe each bad info-item and
reﬂect it in the reputation score. If reporters or monitors can lie, i.e. ﬁle a bad
info-item against a good client, false positives will be too high. Resolution: Since
the monitor model is centralized, it assumes that monitors are trusted and do not
lie. In a reporter model we must prevent reporter lying, i.e. each bad report must
be somehow veriﬁable.
Conﬂict 2: Bad behavior is naturally scarce vs. A bad client may become good
when cleaned. Because bad behavior is scarce, but repeatable, we must remember
bad info-items for a suﬃciently long time to identify repeat oﬀenders. On the other
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hand, a previously bad client that was cleaned and secured should have a way of
redeeming itself and regaining a high reputation score. Resolution: Our reputa-
tion use model from the deﬁnition 3.4 provides short-term reputations that are used
by servers to accept recently cleaned clients’ traﬃc during normal operation. Their
traﬃc will be dropped during DDoS and worm spread, but this eﬀect will be infre-
quent, short-lived and limited to these clients’ traﬃc traveling to a certain server (in
case of DDoS) or to a certain port (in case of worms). There is also an option that
a client redeems itself through human channels, e.g., proving to some trusted entity
that it is no longer compromised. While this should be possible, human actions are
slow and should not be the only path to client redemption.
5 Reporter Model
We now deﬁne how reports are generated in the reporter model.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Report generation: We assume that a server submits a report after
an interaction with a client. Only bad reports are submitted if the interaction was
malicious, i.e., if the client has sent a scan, a worm probe or participated in a DDoS
attack on the server.
An advantage of the reporter model is that the reputation system can be designed
in a fully decentralized manner, using approaches from peer-to-peer reputations sys-
tems [1,3], thus no participant needs to be trusted by all others. Another advantage
is that a server has a very reliable knowledge if a client has interacted with it in a
benevolent or a malicious manner, so false positive reports are not possible.
We identify the following challenges of the reporter model:
Challenge 1: A malicious reporter may lie about good clients. We deﬁne lying
as either submitting an unsolicited bad report (for an interaction that did not oc-
cur) or a bad report after a legitimate transaction. Lying would enable malicious
reporters to ruin good clients’ reputations. Countermeasure: Bad reports must
be veriﬁable. A commonly used report veriﬁcation approach in provider reputation
systems is to have a witness agree by producing a matching report. In client rep-
utation systems, witness model is less feasible because some malicious actions may
be isolated and because witness testimonies could be falsely submitted by bots. We
believe that the lying challenge cannot be overcome in the reporter model, because
of colluding bot actions. We propose in Section 7 a solution for the lying reporter
problem in the reporter-monitor model, by using monitors as veriﬁers who vouch
that the malicious traﬃc has been observed by them.
Challenge 2: An attacker can use spooﬁng to elicit bad reports about a good
client. These reports are solicited and report a true activity, but they assign the
guilt to the wrong party. IP spooﬁng is a major threat that is largely unhandled
in the Internet. Countermeasure: There are several approaches to ﬁlter spoofed
traﬃc at the edge node [8,12,5], that provide varying degrees of security. These ap-
proaches do not ﬁlter all spoofed packets but they can identify and drop a majority
of them. Another approach is to use only traﬃc from established TCP connections
S. Wei, J. Mirkovic / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 179 (2007) 17–3022
for reporting, but this would prevent ﬁling of reports about scanning traﬃc, un-
successful worm probes and DDoS attacks via UDP, ICMP or TCP SYN ﬂoods,
seriously limiting utility of the reputation system. The third approach requires a
reporter to reply to scans and worm probes sent to closed ports and to a dark
address space (not used by a live machine). If a connection is established, this
conﬁrms that the traﬃc was not spoofed and that it was malicious. Such function-
ality of interacting with malicious traﬃc is provided by Honeynets [14], and used
by many networks to monitor malicious activities. These three approaches could be
combined to provide a layered defense that reduces spoofed traﬃc.
Challenge 3: An attacker can fabricate a report from a given server. Coun-
termeasure: A fabricated report will not be veriﬁable and will be rejected by the
reputation system. Because we do not evaluate credibility of information sources
via voting, fabricated reports cannot lower credibility of an alleged server. However,
if we enforce a quota on the number of reports accepted from a given server in some
interval, to control the load of the reputation centers, report fabrication could lead
to a DoS attack on the server whose identity was stolen. To prevent this, each
server must share a secret with the reputation centers and use this secret to sign its
reports.
6 Monitor Model
In this model, monitoring nodes reside on routers and collect observations about
the clients from the traﬃc they relay.
Deﬁnition 6.1 Client behavior is a record containing statistics about the traﬃc
from and to a given client over some period of time, the client’s frequently visited
destinations, requested services, and scans sent and received by this client.
Each monitor summarizes a client’s behavior from the traﬃc it relays and uses it
to build the client’s proﬁle. Because of the distributed monitor locations and routing
patterns, each monitor may build a diﬀerent proﬁle for the same client. Monitors
should periodically exchange client proﬁles to synchronize them. Monitors should
be deployed so to observe a signiﬁcant portion of Internet communications and thus
be able to accurately model behaviors of most clients. One possible deployment
strategy is to place monitors at core Internet nodes that relay traﬃc between a large
number of source-destination pairs. 50 largest autonomous systems can observe
more than 97% of source-destination paths [9].
Some behavior patterns can be identiﬁed as malicious instantly, such as high
scan traﬃc to multiple destinations at the same destination port (worm spread),
high-volume traﬃc from many sources to a common destination (DDoS attack), high
scan traﬃc to multiple ports on the same destination (preparation for intrusion),
etc. These patterns always trigger a generation of a bad info-item. Monitors fur-
ther compare current observations of a client’s behavior with its proﬁle periodically
and record signiﬁcant diﬀerences as anomalies. A client may behave anomalously
because its user has changed his network-usage habits, or because it has been com-
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promised. Since anomalous behavior does not necessarily signal maliciousness, a
prolonged anomalous behavior leads to generation of a suspicious info-item. Sus-
picious info-items are similar to bad info-items; they carry a context ﬁeld that
provides more details about the observed anomaly (e.g., client contacted new des-
tinations on a new service port, client started sending large traﬃc volume, client
has been contacted by another bad client and possibly compromised). We will call
a client that has been an object of at least one suspicious info-item, and no bad
info-items, a suspicious client. Reputation users can devise their own policy how to
treat suspicious clients during various security incidents, and based on the context
of suspicious info-items.
An advantage of the monitor model is that a low number of deployment points
are required to observe a signiﬁcant portion of Internet traﬃc. The system is nat-
urally centralized, and since monitors are located in large organizations that are
already critical for Internet operation, they should be trusted. Another advantage
of a monitor model is that, in addition to client proﬁling, monitoring large portion
of the Internet traﬃc would be useful for early detection of Internet anomalies, such
as heavy scanning activity and worm propagation, or even for discovery of DDoS
attack preparation via botnet recruitment.
We next identify challenges faced by a monitor model and propose countermea-
sures.
Challenge 1: Client proﬁle integration and update. Due to the diﬀerent lo-
cations, monitors may proﬁle diﬀerent behaviors for the same client. The proﬁles
should also be updated continuously with newly observed traﬃc. Countermea-
sure: A client’s proﬁles from diﬀerent monitors are periodically integrated using
diﬀerent weights. The weight of each monitor’s proﬁle is determined according to
the observed traﬃc volume used to create this proﬁle. Proﬁles are periodically up-
dated using newly observed traﬃc if the client’s behavior has not been ﬂagged as
anomalous.
Challenge 2: Monitoring overhead. Monitors need a large memory to store
client proﬁles, and they have to build proﬁles and detect anomalies online. Coun-
termeasure: Monitors should only proﬁle clients that produce suﬃcient traﬃc to
warrant building a proﬁle. Proﬁles of clients with similar behaviors should be com-
bined to save space. Our previous research on host clustering using behavior proﬁles
[15] has shown that many hosts behave similarly and can be grouped into large and
representative clusters. Host clusters can be used for anomaly detection, while sav-
ing memory. It is also possible to build quality proﬁles from sampled traﬃc, which
can reduce per-packet processing overhead. [15]
Challenge 3: An attacker can elicit false observations through spooﬁng. Coun-
termeasure: Core-based ﬁltering techniques, such as [11,8,5], can be used to ﬁlter
out a majority of spoofed packets. Approaches such as using traﬃc from established
TCP connections for observations are not applicable because a monitor may reside
on asymmetric traﬃc paths and may not be able to detect established connections.
The monitor model is thus more vulnerable to spooﬁng than the reporter model. In
section 7.2 we discuss how a combination of these two models can lead to a strong
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spoofed traﬃc countermeasure.
Challenge 4: Monitors can be bypassed. While monitors reside on a large
number of paths, they can be bypassed if an attacker is aware of their locations.
Countermeasure: We could deploy monitoring nodes at more points; e.g. an
ideal coverage can be achieved if monitors are deployed on the vertex cover of the
Internet topology [11]. However, the required number of monitors is large (around
4,000 for the current topology).
7 Reporter-Monitor Model
Both the reporter and the monitor model suﬀer from serious drawbacks such as
lying, false positives and spooﬁng, and thus cannot provide a reliable reputation
input. We now propose the combined reporter-monitor model, that addresses these
remaining challenges.
7.1 Handling Reporter Lying
A monitor in the reporter-monitor model marks each packet it relays with a secret
mark. This mark is bound to the packet, to prevent its stealing and reuse, by using
a private hash function to hash a packet’s contents and header with the monitor’s
secret. The mark is placed in the packet’s IP header, either in the options ﬁeld
or in the IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld, which can be safely overwritten if the packet is
not fragmented. Servers ﬁle reports about bad clients. Additionally, monitors may
collect client behavior statistics, build proﬁles and generate bad and suspicious
reports about a client.
Each report is veriﬁed for accuracy by a veriﬁer, using the secret mark knowl-
edge. The veriﬁer can be the monitor who placed the mark, or some trusted third
party, which knows the monitor’s secret. Since monitoring routers relay large traﬃc
volume it would be reasonable to minimize their overhead by delegating veriﬁcation
to other nodes.
When a bad report is submitted to a veriﬁer, it examines the context ﬁeld
in the report and challenges the reporter to submit traﬃc samples chosen by the
veriﬁer in a non-predictable manner. For example, if a report’s context ﬁeld was
“scan traﬃc on ports 1—1024” a veriﬁer may request submission of scans for ports
32 and 1011. Samples are veriﬁed for authenticity by verifying their secret mark,
and the report is accepted and stored in the reputation system if all samples pass
the veriﬁcation. Otherwise the report is discarded. The conﬁdence in the report
grows with the number of samples checked, but a veriﬁer’s overhead grows also, so
there is a tradeoﬀ between performing a thorough check and minimizing veriﬁcation
overhead.
Note that the veriﬁcation process does not prove that the traﬃc was malicious,
it only veriﬁes that header values in the samples ﬁt the context ﬁeld in the report.
Reported traﬃc rate can also be veriﬁed if monitors change their secrets periodically,
e.g. every second. This is highly desirable to prevent reuse of accumulated old traﬃc
by malicious reporters to fabricate new reports. A reported attack with the rate of
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Incident Context Veriﬁcation
Scan Range of ports scanned (R), 
rate in pps (P), 
start time, end time 
Ask for N chosen samples and verify mark, 
destination port and SYN ﬂag (if TCP) or 
request ﬂag (non-TCP),
ask for 2P consecutive samples to verify rate.
Worm Port scanned (p), 
rate in pps (P),
addresses of scanned 
machines (A) 
start time, end time 
Ask for N chosen samples and verify mark, 
destination port, SYN ﬂag (if TCP) and 
destination address,
ask for 2P consecutive samples to verify rate
DDoS Type of attack (e.g., SYN ﬂood)
relevant header values
for this attack (h), 
rate in pps (P)
start time, end time 
Ask for N chosen samples and verify mark, 
and header values,
ask for 2P consecutive samples to verify rate
Fig. 1. Report veriﬁcation steps
P packets per second can be veriﬁed by requiring 2 · P consecutive traﬃc samples
to be submitted, and verifying that P of them are marked using the same secret.
Figure 1 illustrates veriﬁcation steps for several context types, for our incidents of
interest.
Each monitor must share each new secret with a veriﬁer, which brings additional
overhead. We can minimize this overhead if we share a secret and rules for new secret
generation, between each monitor node and all veriﬁers, and we assume that their
clocks are loosely synchronized so that the drift between any two clocks is smaller
than the secret change interval. A veriﬁer can then calculate all the monitors’ past,
present and future secrets without any further communication. During a report
veriﬁcation, a veriﬁer needs to try at most three secrets for each monitor (previous,
current and future secret, because of loose clock synchronization) before ﬁnding the
right one for the ﬁrst sample. After this, the same secret can be used to verify the
rest of the samples for this report.
7.2 Handling Spooﬁng
In Section 5 we proposed a combination of several approaches to handle spooﬁng.
In the reporter-monitor model, monitors should perform some chosen core-ﬁltering
approach [11,5,12], and reporters should respond to each scan or a worm probe
that they plan to report. For example, if a reporter observes scans on ports 10—24
with a rate of 100 packets per second, it needs to close 200 connections (to verify
the rate) and to ensure that at least one scan for each port 10—24 belonged to a
connection that was closed. Veriﬁcation samples should contain all three packets
from a TCP handshake and two of them (the SYN and the ﬁnal ACK) should carry
an authentic monitor mark, while sequence and acknowledgment numbers in all
three packets should match as described in [13].
The above strategy veriﬁes the absence of spooﬁng for scan and worm probe
traﬃc, and it could also be used for DDoS ﬂash-crowd type attacks because they
require a malicious client to establish a TCP connection with the server. However,
there are many DDoS attacks that can be successful without an established TCP
connection, e.g.., UDP ﬂood, ICMP ﬂood, TCP SYN ﬂood. Such DDoS traﬃc may
be spoofed and cannot be veriﬁed using our proposed technique. To diﬀerentiate
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between reports that can or cannot prove the absence of spooﬁng in the reported
incident, we add a no-spooﬁng ﬂag to each report. This ﬂag is stored along with
the report and served to requesting parties.
7.3 Aggregating Reports Into Reputations
Reports must be aggregated into a reputation score, either by the reputation system
or by reputation users. We now propose an aggregation method assuming the
reporter-monitor model and that only bad and suspicious reports are generated.
Bad reports that can be elicited via spoofed traﬃc will have a no-spooﬁng ﬂag
reset. Our aggregation rules ensure that such reports facilitate traﬃc prioritization
during congestion events such as worm spread and DDoS attacks, but they cannot
harm good clients during normal operation.





R, if count(ubrns) = 0 and count(ubrys) = 0∑
r∈brns r.pts, if count(brns) > 0∑
r∈brys r.pts · d, if count(brns) = 0 and count(brys) > 0
(2)
where R is a default reputation value, assigned initially to a client, brns is a set of
bad reports with no-spooﬁng ﬂag set, brys is a set of bad reports with no-spooﬁng
ﬂag reset, count(·) counts elements in the set and d is a positive discount factor,
d  1. The calculation yields positive reputations for good clients, large negative
reputations for bad clients whose maliciousness and identity can be veriﬁed, and
small negative reputations for bad clients whose bad reports contain no-spooﬁng
ﬂag reset. Note that suspicious reports are not used for reputation calculation but
are served raw to requesting parties.
Reputations are used to prioritize traﬃc in the following manner:
• During DDoS attacks and worm spread incidents calculate long-term reputations
using all bad reports for a client and the formula 2. Assign the highest priority to
clients with positive reputation values, then serve the traﬃc in the following order
of decreasing priorities: (1) traﬃc from clients with a small negative reputation,
(2) traﬃc from suspicious clients. Reject traﬃc from clients with a large negative
reputation.
• During normal operation calculate short-term reputations using observations dur-
ing last Tint seconds only, and the formula 2. Accept traﬃc from clients with pos-
itive reputations. Use context information from reports to make a policy decision
about suspicious clients and clients with small negative reputations (e.g., if a con-
text indicates a recent communication with a compromised client we may want
to reject this communication). Reject traﬃc from clients with a large negative
reputation.
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8 Cost
The proposed reputation system requires placement of monitors at large ISPs. A
minimal functionality required from monitors is marking traﬃc to support veriﬁ-
cation process and ﬁltering of spoofed packets. Packet-marking is a low-cost oper-
ation, while spoofed traﬃc ﬁltering requires a monitor to build a table that links
each source with some chosen parameter value and to perform per-packet checks of
the packets’ parameters against the stored values in the table.
The rest of the reputation system contains reporters, veriﬁers and reputation
centers, and can be organized in a distributed manner. Servers would thus contact
local reputation centers to submit reports and retrieve reputations, while reputation
centers would periodically talk to exchange recent reports. Reputation centers can
be organized into a peer-to-peer network to facilitate report exchange and existing
approaches from provider reputation systems can be applied to ensure that com-
promise of a reputation center cannot jeopardize credibility of client reputations.
Communication overhead for report submission may be large in case of large-
scale security incidents such as worm spread, so reputation centers may be over-
whelmed. To control this overhead, we propose that a reporter aggregates all its
reports within some interval into a combined report, and ﬁles only this report at
the end of the interval. The combined report size may also be limited, e.g., by
requesting that a reporter choose reports that describe top N security incidents in
the previous interval.
Reputation scores or recent anonymized reports can be periodically downloaded
by reputation users. These downloads can be scheduled to minimize congestion and
they can be retrieved from a local reputation center. Since a client is presumed
good in absence of bad reports, reputation users need only store identities of bad
clients. Given that the largest botnet up to date contained half a million bots [10],
we estimate the cost of such storage to several million records.
The reputation system must be protected from report and reputation fabrication
through standard cryptographic means. Each reporter must exchange a shared or
a public key with its local reputation centers and sign each report with this key.
A reputation center must sign each reputation update with its private key and
local servers must possess the corresponding public key to verify the signature. It
is likely that an extensive key exchange infrastructure would be needed to support
secure operation of the client reputation system. Existing key exchange mechanisms,
proposed for provider reputation systems, can be reused in this novel context.
9 Related Work
In [2] Allman et al. propose an architecture for behavioral history that could be
applied to “actors” such as Internet hosts, mail servers, mail addresses, Web identi-
ties, etc. The goal of this system is to build an audit trail of an actor’s behavior that
can be used to form a policy at the traﬃc receiver’s side and suppress unwanted
traﬃc. While the proposed system builds client reputations, its architecture is dis-
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cussed at a very high level, and the design leaves many opportunities for attackers
to trick the system. For instance, authors propose that a report is valued higher
if other reporters have observed similar behavior or if they voted that the report
was useful to them. We discussed in Section 4 why it is not reasonable to require
matching observations for all malicious behaviors, and in Section 2 how any kind
of voting can be misused by an attacker who controls a bot network. Our veriﬁer
functionality requires minimal processing by the routers (marking packets) and en-
ables report conﬁrmation by a separate trusted entity in possession of the monitor’s
secret, while [2] proposes that reports be veriﬁed by witnesses that store packets
and retrieve them on demand. Drawbacks of packet recording approach are: a sig-
niﬁcant memory requirement, short life of records and a required participation of
routers in conﬁrming reports. Finally, we consider the major threat posed by IP
spooﬁng to client reputation system, and propose several approaches to alleviate
this threat, while [2] discusses spooﬁng only superﬁcially.
In [1], Aberer and Despotovic propose a decentralized model for trust man-
agement in P2P networks. Their distributed report storage architecture could be
reused for a client reputation system, but the proposed trust calculation, that values
matching reports higher, is not applicable to client reputations because of inconsis-
tency of bad behavior.
In [7], Hou et al. compute peer reputations based on satisfactory and unsatis-
factory transactions; this last category is similar to the bad reports in our system.
Authors do not consider cheating which is a major threat in the open client rep-
utation system we proposed, and they assume that every peer rates every other
peer, while in our system reporters cannot be rated through voting due to a strong
adversary model.
In [3] authors propose a reputation system integrated with the Gnutella P2P net-
work where participants use peer votes to discover trustworthy resource providers.
Authors consider cheating via creation of false identities, and propose to discover
clusters of such identities via grouping peers by their IP address. Proposed mech-
anisms do not apply to our attacker model, which enables bots to vote using their
real identities. In [4] authors extend the peer reputation system with resource rep-
utations. This helps establishment of more reliable provider reputations but is not
directly applicable to client reputation systems.
10 Conclusions
We have proposed a client reputation system that could be used to reduce unwanted
traﬃc in the Internet. Such a system faces a unique set of challenges that we have
surveyed in this paper and proposed countermeasures. While much work remains
to be done in designing a practical, secure and usable client reputation system, we
believe that our proposed reporter-monitor model has provided a good ﬁrst step in
this direction.
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